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Introduction
The British government’s controversial counter-terrorism strategies and policies have come under 
fierce opposition with critics arguing it has not actually prevented extremism but has manifested 
itself into a political and ideological campaign that unfairly targets the Muslim community.[1] 
Moreover, such strategies have marginalised the Muslim community in the UK from wider civic 
society and created an atmosphere of hate and anger. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, David 
Cameron in 2010, spoke at a conference in Munich about security, radicalisation, and multi-
culturalism, sparking a debate about how the UK monitors and deals with extremism. Blaming 
the doctrine of ‘state-multiculturalism’ the British coalition government argued for a more ‘active 
muscular liberalism’ which would identify the root causes of extremist ideologies[2].  Moreover, 
this paranoia and hysteria has led to a social, political, moral and theological debate about 
Islamism, Muslims, and terrorism which is fuelled by the way Britain is portrayed across the 
world as a country where extremist organisations employ tactics of persuasion, indoctrination, 
radicalisation and the promotion of religious intolerance. [3]
In 2010, the UK government review of counter-terrorist legislation and policy included 
examining the broader counter-terrorists strategies i.e. CONTEST. The focus of CONTEST is to 
reduce the risk to the UK from international terrorism, and has four key strands which include 
Prevent. The others are; Pursue-which aims to stop terrorist attacks; Protect-which endeavours to 
strengthen systems against terrorist attacks; and Prepare for a terrorist attack by mitigating its 
impact[4]. Part of such counter-terrorism policies in Britain has led to an erosion of trust between 
Muslim communities and law enforcement agencies.   
The Social Impact
Furthermore, the Prevent Strategy 2011 is being driven by state led policies, embedded within 
vague and ambiguous local initiatives that lack both clarity and detail and in effect get Muslim 
communities to act as informants who provide intelligence on their local community. [5] After 
the events of July 7, 2005 the British government came under immense scrutiny to improve its 
security and resilience in the face of the ‘new’ terrorist threat.  Indeed, this led to a shift in 
counter-terrorism policy which now examines not just international terrorism but terrorist threats 
closer to home. Since those attacks on British soil, the UK has seen a flurry of counter-terrorism 
	  Journal	  of	  Terrorism	  Research	  	  	  	  	  Volume	  2,	  Issue	  3	  	  	  -­‐	  Law	  Special	  Edition
4	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   November	  2011
legislation that has led to a heightened atmosphere with the current terrorist threat being (at the 
time of writing) ‘substantial.’   
Inevitably, within this climate of fear, British Muslims have became deeply suspicious of 
counter-terrorism policy including strategies such as Prevent. Fenwick and Choudhury (2010) 
argue that; “Counter-terrorism measures are contributing to a wider sense among Muslims that 
they are being treated as a ‘suspect community’ and targeted by authorities simply because of 
their religion.” [6] The government vision for the Prevent programme is to establish an 
institution of law abiding Muslims that value the British way of life and engage within society, 
thereby at the same time reducing the risk of home-grown terrorism and extremism.   
This is something the previous Prime Minister of Britain, Gordon Brown, argued was a principle 
grounded in the narrative of ‘winning hearts and minds’ i.e. using softer forms of engagement 
with communities as opposed to heavy handed counter-terror tactics which are counter intuitive 
and risk further alienating Muslim communities.  However the new strategy remains flawed and 
passive in debate and discussion of critical issues. 
Indeed, the new Prevent Strategy 2011 will lead to problematic relations between policing and 
community engagement by creating barriers that will impact upon partnership work within a 
societal context. Prevent 2011 aims to create more local activism amongst Muslim’s within 
society that gets them to accept the responsibility of helping identify would be extremists and at 
the same time improving community approaches with the police. Moreover theoretical studies in 
relation to the process of extremism include the adaptation of the ‘social network theory’, which 
views extremism as a social movement and social progression. Furthermore, this model uses 
societal causal factors to describe how actors that use different modes of recruitment tactics such 
as personal meetings, social activism and indoctrination influence people.  
This model also takes into account concepts of behavioural and environmental factors that 
contribute to wider causes of extremism. It is clear that socio-economic and cultural factors do 
play a role in determining who becomes an extremist however Prevent does little to move the 
debate forward. Within such a framework the impact on local communities has been immense.  
Indeed recent research in this area indicates that many Muslims feel they are being discriminated 
against within society as a result of counter-terrorist strategies such as Prevent often leading to an 
increase in hate crimes committed against them. [7] 
Defeating terrorism requires a more coherent, clear and constructive analysis of the problem such 
as factors that often lead to someone feeling they wish to commit an act of terror and although 
Prevent aims to cure the disease of terrorism it fails to do so in a number of ways. For example it 
has alienated the Muslim community, led to poor relations between Muslim communities and 
wide civic society, increased tensions between the police and local communities and fuelled 
further dissent and anger amongst many Muslim communities who feel they are being unfairly 
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targeted. Therefore, the disease will only spread as a result of such ill-informed policies and the 
only way to eradicate it will require much more emphasis on communication and dialogue.  
Prevent 2011
The Prevent Strategy 2011 contains three main objectives; firstly, tackling the ideological causes 
and challenges of terrorism; secondly to prevent people from being drawn into terrorist related 
acts by ensuring advice and support measures are provided to people who are deemed at risk of 
extremism; and finally promoting partnerships between institutions working together to tackle 
the risk of radicalisation and extremism. Although in principle this notion of tackling terrorism 
seems objective it is in practice similar to previous Prevent strategies in that it lacks clarity when 
it comes to defining key terms and above all fails to distinguish between extremists and Muslims.
In an in-depth study conducted by Fenwick and Choudhury which sought to explore the issues of 
both Muslims and non-Muslims across Britain about the impact of counter-terrorism laws and 
policy revealed that British Muslims felt the lack of accountability as regards the policing of 
Prevent and were concerned with all government counter-terrorism strategies which had 
undermined the government’s central focus of community cohesion. Indeed, the Prevent Strategy 
2011 has the potential of making Muslim communities more suspicious of law enforcement 
agencies leading into a growing sense of fear and a lack of trust in the British political system. 
Jarvis and Lister conducted a series of focus groups with Muslim communities that aimed to 
examine British Muslims views as regards UK counter-terrorism policy. They found that Muslim 
communities and police relations had been damaged by counter-terrorism strategies such as 
Prevent[8]. Furthermore, this type of analysis has led to a perception by Muslim communities 
that they have been unfairly targeted and treated as a ‘suspect’ community due to the nature in 
which counter-terrorism policy has solely focussed on identifying Muslim citizens as extremists.   
Research also indicates that many Muslims feel they are being discriminated against as a result of 
counter-terrorist strategies such as Prevent often leading to an increase in hate crimes committed 
against them[9].    
Moreover, the broader literature suggests that Muslims in the UK feel that law enforcement 
agencies (such as the police) have begun to use a deliberate campaign of surveillance with 
regards to addressing the threat from terrorism. Thus, one of the debates about the new Prevent 
Strategy 2011 is the manner in which it is becoming labelled as an agenda for ‘spying’ upon local 
Muslim communities. For example, initiatives such as Project Champion which involved the 
police using covert and overt surveillance cameras in predominately Muslim areas of 
Birmingham (in the UK) was heavily criticised for breaching rules of liberal democracy and 
human rights and also at the same time targeting vulnerable minority communities[10]. This in 
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effect has constructed a ‘suspect’ community within the dictum of community engagement for 
counter-terrorism purposes.  
Overall, the Prevent Strategy 2011 aims to eradicate and prevent extremism through the 
identification of extremists by tackling the ‘root’ causes of that ideology (i.e. the radicalisation 
process which is where people support extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups).  
According to the British Home Secretary, Theresa May, the previous Prevent policy was flawed 
because it failed to identify the threat of extremism[11]. However, the Home Secretary does fail 
to identify what the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ actually mean or provide any robust 
research or insights as to whom might be an ‘extremist’ or how to identify characteristics of 
someone that has been ‘radicalised’. The problem with this lack of detail is the potential to 
profile activities and people as extremists or terrorists without evidence, for example the police 
could use their powers of investigation to arrest innocent Muslims purely because of their 
ethnicity, name, and religion. Moreover, her speech has the potential to instil fear as well as raise 
public sentiment, thus leading to more discriminate acts against law abiding Muslim citizens 
whom are viewed as extremists. Indeed, this government narrative has previously led to 
unpopular counter-terror legislation, suspicion and intrusive powers of surveillance against 
Muslim communities.
   
Conclusion
Muslim communities reject terrorism but are increasingly, in political discourse being asked 
questions about their patriotism and stance on British values. These are deliberate attempts that 
provide a nuance for discrimination and prejudice. The only way to prevent extremism is for the 
state to interfere less and begin to try to understand the causes and drivers for radicalisation.  
Societal issues such as gang culture; bullying, deprivation and a lack of education would be some 
examples. Furthermore, there needs to be more dialogue and communication. Political pressures 
on local police forces have meant a higher level of policing in mainly Muslim areas that has 
further fuelled dissent and alienation. Moreover, the Prevent Strategy 2011 acts as a double-
edged sword; on the one hand it encourages Muslims to integrate and help support community 
engagement but on the other hand it uses counter-terrorism policies to ‘spy’ upon Muslim 
communities.     
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